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TOWARD AN UNDERSTANDING
OF TYPES OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE
COOPERATION
PETER V. SCHAEFFER
West Virginia University

SCOTT LOVERIDGE

Michigan State University

T here is a long tradition of public-private cooperation (PPC), particularly

tion and health care (e.g., Kuhnle & Selle, 1992, who refer to the "field of welf
social affairs"). Savitch (1998) dates such cooperative efforts in Europe back as

the 16th century. In the United States, Beauregard (1998) sees PPC emerge in th
dle to late 1880s. Over the past 25 years, PPC has also become an important part of

local economic development policy (Brooks, Liebman, & Schelling, 1984; Committee
for Economic Development, 1982; Fosler & Berger, 1982; Walzer & Jacobs, 1998;

Weaver & Dennert, 1987; Westeren, 2000; see Isserman, 1994, for a description of the

evolution of state economic development policy in the United States). This change is
highlighted in the reinventing government movement that gained momentum in the

1990s (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992). Gray (1985) is likely to speak for many when she
sees "a growing need to promote collaborative problem solving across various sectors

of society" (p. 911). Although we refer to cooperation rather than collaboration, the
two terms have such closely related meanings that we treat them as synonymous.
Joint public-private efforts are often referred to as public-private partnerships (e.g.,
Pierre, 1998; Vaillancourt Rosenau, 2000a). This term is being used not only in the

United States but has also been adopted in other countries, such as Germany, Sweden,
Great Britain (Heinz, 1993), Norway (Westeren, 2000), and Canada (Ministry of

Municipal Affairs, 1999). For additional examples, see Walzer and Jacobs (1998). A
keyword search on the Internet yielded tens of thousands of entries; among them were
many from outside the United States.
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Public officials encounter PPC in a variety of ways, for example, in agreements

pave roads in new subdivisions, public participation in industrial recruitment or spo
team-retention activities, and privatization of subsidized public services (e.g.,

Lawther, 2000). This article addresses the concern that the widespread use of the term

public-private partnership for a variety of public-private cooperative efforts implies
commonality among them that does not exist (see also Peters, 1998). Differences in
characteristics of PPC that are important to their success or failure may therefore be
overlooked (Lawless, 1993). Ingerson (1999) states that "the range of projects

described as 'public-private partnerships' is enormous" and voices the suspicion of

(unnamed) critics and skeptics "that these so-called 'partnerships' are really subcontracting or grantmaking." A Web search provided further evidence of the imprecise,
and sometimes careless, use of the term. For example, the British public sector union

UNISON (n.d.) defines public-private partnerships as "any arrangement where a public service is delivered in co-operation with the private sector" and refers to "a growing

use of public-private partnerships (PPPs) across the public sector." The Ministry of
Municipal Affairs (1999), British Columbia, presents a similar definition:
Public private partnerships (PPPs) are arrangements between government and private
sector entities for the purpose of providing public infrastructure, community facilities
and related services. Such partnerships are characterized by the sharing of investment,
risk, responsibility and reward between the partners.

This definition is general regarding the form but specific and narrow regarding the pur-

pose of the "partnership," with the purpose being limited to the private provision of
public goods. Savas (2000) similarly emphasizes the private provision of public services. Vogel (2000) presents a legal analysis of the opposite-the public provision of
private goods. He also provides a large number of examples of public-private interaction in the provision of both public and private goods. His work illustrates that the line

that separates public sector from private sector roles is fuzzy and changeable. The lack

of an agreed-upon vocabulary for describing different cooperative efforts is also evidenced by the absence of clear definitions for terms such as alliance, coalition, association, and so forth.

As planners articulate their activities with economic development initiatives, there
is a need to categorize the types of PPC to understand how form, function, and outcomes are related. Although economic development activities are the basis for many of
our illustrative cases, the conceptual framework is broadly applicable to other situa-

tions where planners may work with the private and public sectors to achieve complementary goals. The general purpose of this article is to provide a vocabulary for the
study of cooperation between the public and the private for-profit sectors.

The examples focus on economic development for two reasons. First, the need for
analysis is greater because of the relatively recent growth of states collaborating with
private industry to promote economic development (Isserman, 1994; Walzer &

Jacobs, 1998; Weaver & Dennert, 1987). Second, the potential for significant conflicts
of interest in economic development is great (Reese & Rosenfeld, 2001). For example,
a government that enters into a PPC with a private firm and makes a significant finan-

cial investment (or invests significant political capital) may be reluctant to pursue sus-
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pected violations of rules and regulations by its private "partner" if this would endan-

ger the success of the cooperative project. In other words, the government may lose, or
be perceived of having lost, its impartiality when it assumes a large tangible interest in

the success of private projects. PPC may also affect interfirm competition. When, in
1991, the city of Denver offered substantial financial incentives to United Airlines to
locate its maintenance facility at the new Denver International Airport, Continental
Airlines was quick to request similar concessions for its already existing facility, on the

basis of competitive fairness. (United Airlines ended up locating its facility elsewhere.) For another critical perspective on conflicts of interest, consult Cummings,
Koebel, and Whitt (1989). Finally, close cooperation between the public and the private sectors in economic development could lead to inequitable outcomes (e.g.,
Krumholz, 1999).
The rest of the article is organized as follows. The next section identifies dimen-

sions of PPC participant interest that are helpful in understanding potential outcomes
of cooperation. Then, we present a discussion of differences when the cooperation is
between the public sector and the private sector as opposed to private-private or public-

public cooperation. An inventory of forms of PPC follows. We then note special differences encountered when the cooperator is a nonprofit. The final section provides a
summary and conclusions.

Critical Dimensions for the Analysis of Cooperative Efforts
Our analysis is limited to voluntary cooperation. A necessary condition for the existence of voluntary cooperative agreements is that all participants expect to end up
better off than they would have if they were acting alone. This can happen only if the
correlation between the expected rewards of the participants is positive. Rewards can
be both tangible and intangible (values, beliefs, relationships). Gray (1985), in an
influential article, refers to interdependencies among stakeholders.

Cooperation makes participants better off if (a) by pooling their resources, they

obtain efficiencies; or (b) by combining complementary strengths, they can increase
the scope of their activities; and/or (c) cooperation reinforces the mission or satisfies
values or beliefs. The intent to cooperate does not guarantee success, however. The
likelihood of success depends on how well participants coordinate their decisions and
actions. Decisions can also be "directively correlated," that is, directed toward common values or ideals but without coordination of specific actions-such that the cooperating parties move together toward achieving the same purpose or mission. One of

the benefits of voluntary cooperation is that each participant gains some measure of
influence over the decisions of all other participants. Of course, in return, each participant relinquishes some control over its own decisions. The extent to which decisions of
one party support and reinforce the decisions of other parties is an important criterion
for characterizing cooperative efforts (see C. Ellis, 1996, for private sector examples).
The success of cooperation also depends on adherence to agreed-upon rules and
norms. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) study how bargaining power affects cooperative

behavior and, in particular, free rider behavior. In a related article, Fehr and Gachter
(2000b) show that reciprocity serves as an important factor for the enforcement of contracts and social norms. Finally, in a third related contribution, Fehr and Gachter
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(2000a) report on experiments that indicate that free riders are punished and that
punishment is proportional to their deviation from established norms. This reinforces

C. Ellis's (1996) argument that cooperative agreements need to be nurtured and
managed.

Cooperative efforts cover a wide range of projects and activities. This analysis is
not concerned with short-term, one-time efforts dealing with simple issues or projects.
As Dewar and Isaac (1998) note, there is a tendency for implementation to be in a con-

sultant mode when the project is a small part of the mandate or when the project is short
term. Cooperation is easier (less threatening) when little is at stake. Short-term issues
requiring collaborative efforts can often be handled by a temporary ad hoc task force
with members representing the cooperating organizations (Mandell, 1999). In this
article, we are interested in sustained cooperative efforts that require a significant commitment of human and/or financial resources, which may take place over an extended

period. Figure 1 summarizes the influence on the form of cooperation by the various
dimensions of the cooperative effort. The compatibility of goals dimension relates to
the correlation between the expected rewards of the participants and organizational

culture (shared values and decision-making protocols). The coordination of decisions dimension reflects the extent to which the cooperators correlate their actions.
The commitment of resources dimension encompasses human, financial, and social
capital.

The stronger the positive correlation between the expected rewards of participants,

the stronger their incentive to coordinate their actions to mutual benefit (Gray, 1985,
see particularly her Propositions 2, 3, and 6, pp. 921, 926). When cooperation fails in

spite of the existence of strong positive correlation between expected rewards, we have
missed opportunities, and all potential participants are losers. One can think of a num-

ber of reasons cooperation does not exist. It is possible that the law keeps a government
entity from cooperating. It is also possible that a private sector member does not under-

stand, or lacks patience for, the decision-making process in the public sector. For
example, the lack of confidentiality in the public sector may keep private sector members from cooperating with the public sector if they fear that such cooperation makes
sensitive information available to competitors.
There are, of course, situations when the interests of different agents are mutually
incompatible. Cooperation cannot persist in such situations, unless it is the result of
coercion. Either agents will learn from their mistakes and change their behaviors or

other agents who pursue their self-interests more successfully will displace them. Similarly, agents who fail to exploit the benefits from cooperation will eventually lose out
to agents who pursue cooperative opportunities. In the remainder of this article, we

will therefore limit our attention to situations characterized by mutually compatible
interests.

Limiting exposure to risks is a powerful incentive for cooperation (e.g., Linder,
2000). For example, when faced with a year 2000 incompatibility problem in their

accounting software, three universities jointly cooperated with a software corporation
to adapt its business accounting software for use in a university setting. The universities reduced their risk because the corporation offered reduced rates for software
development and because they knew the other universities would assist them in finetuning the software to a university setting. The software company reduced its risks
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Compatibility of Goals

Form of Cooperative Effort

Coordination of Commitment of
Decisions Resources

Figure 1. Dimensions Influencing the Form of Cooperation: Goals, Coordination, and Resources

because it had a minimum of three major customers for its final product (conversion to
another provider is quite expensive for the universities, so the choice represents a longterm revenue stream for the software company). All four parties still faced substantial

risks-the corporation in development costs and the universities in staff costs, if the
new system did not function well. The cooperation reduced but did not eliminate the
risk. Cooperation is most likely in the case of very risky projects that promise a very
high return. When expected rewards are high and risks are low, efficiency gains from

cooperation would have to be high because risk reduction is not a significant concern.
In general, therefore, the most promising cooperative situations are those where
rewards correlate positively with risks.

Public and Private Sector Differences
The dimensions presented in the previous section apply not only to public-private

cooperative efforts but all cooperative efforts. However, there are unique characteristics of PPC that deserve our attention. Many of these characteristics are related to the
different missions of private organizations compared to the missions of public organizations. The differences in the missions are also reflected in the way in which each
organization is financed and governed, such as differences between bureaucratic, hier-

archical organizations and entrepreneurial organizations with flatter decision-making
structures. PPC is therefore different from cooperation between all public or all private
entities. The following paragraphs enumerate important differences between public

and private organizations (see also Withney, 1993). For a perspective on PPC from the
perspective of the private for-profit sector, see Austin and McCaffrey (2002).
Executives of private sector for-profit organizations are generally accountable only
to their owners or stockholders or, in some cases, to other stakeholders (employees,

creditors, communities where their plants are located, etc.). Decisions can usually be
made without being scrutinized by the public, though in some cases there are repercussions such as class action suits, boycotts, or public protests. The recent travails of the
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tobacco industry and Microsoft are cases in point, but these kinds of experiences mak

headline news because they are rare in the private sector. By contrast, important dec

sions in the public sector are usually discussed in an open forum and subject to inten

scrutiny by the press, interest groups, and private citizens. For example, in Mononga

County, West Virginia, after the school board decided to promise new constructi

contracts to local unionized firms only, nonunion construction firms raised money f

advertisements against the school bond vote. The prospect of intense public scrutiny

may reduce the willingness of public sector executives, and particularly of elected off

cials, to take on controversial issues. The private sector's ability to hold discussion

behind closed doors insulates leaders in this sector from similar scrutiny until after
decision is being implemented.

Another significant difference between the public sector and the private sector is

the special powers of governmental organizations. Unlike the private sector, which
relies on persuasion, the public sector can force compliance with its plans. The law and
related policies, when followed, work to ensure that important government decisions
are made in public and are subject to guidelines to ensure fairness, because powers of

coercion can easily be abused. In the United States, many states have "sunshine laws"
that require discussions of important actions to be open to the public. The federal Free-

dom of Information Act is another indication of the importance assigned to sharing
information with the public. Such information sharing and transparency are in marked
contrast to decision making in the private sector, where business firms are reluctant to

share information that could be used by competitors. The private sector's reluctance to
share its business information and the public sector's legal obligation to make informa-

tion public can lead to tension in economic development practice (for an example concerning conflict over the confidentiality of information, see "State Defends Secrecy,"
1996; "State Says Letting Public Know," 1995).
The legitimacy of governments comes from the support they enjoy among their citi-

zens (e.g., Linder, 2000). To maintain the citizens' confidence, public organizations
have to be responsive to the needs and interests of all citizens and must provide opportunity for citizen input into the decision-making process. Thus, decisions made in pub-

lic and the process are often slow and subject to competing interests.
The public sector may also be less vulnerable to financial risks than private organizations because of its exemption from certain forms of legal liability. Even when governments can be held liable, the extent of their financial liability is often limited. In
addition, its sources of revenues are more stable because of the reliance on taxes. Cus-

tomers can be fickle. Today's top product can be tomorrow's unwanted inventory,
whereas citizens must pay their taxes year after year, whether they like the services
they receive or not. However, the government's contributions to a PPC need not be
financed from general revenues. In those cases, the government's sources of funds are
probably as much subjected to uncertainty as the private partner's.

Finally, private sector organizations have legal scope to engage in a wide range of
activities. Their scope is primarily limited by employment, patent, and antitrust laws;

the organization's capacity for change; and revenue generation. Government entities

are much more restricted in what they can do. Government activities are also geographically limited; the private sector faces few statutory limitations on its geographic

scope, though the market imposes limits on the private sector.
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The preceding paragraphs illustrate important philosophical and legal differences
between private sector and public sector organizations. Such differences impose dif-

ferent constraints on PPC than those in private-private cooperation. However, it is
exactly because of the differences between the public and the private sector that opportunities for mutually beneficial cooperation arise. The two sectors have complementary powers, and thus, each can help the other accomplish things that may otherwise
not be feasible. PPC initiatives may also serve to strengthen awareness and appreciation of diversity and interdependence as important organizational operating principles.
We should, however, heed the warning of Stone, Doherty, Jones, and Ross (1998) who,

commenting on school district/business relationships, write,
Yet notwithstanding enthusiasm among education administrators for the idea of com-

pacts and other partnership programs, the programs may rest on an unsteady foundation.
Businesses and school systems operate in fundamnentally different ways. Moreover, while
top school officials value the favorable publicitr that accompanies partnership with busi-

ness, schools are accustomed to extensive inde ?endence, especially in day-to-day operations. (p. 366)

Cooperation between all-private participants also occurs because of their complementary capabilities, but differences amor-g them are usually less fundamental than

those between the public and the private members in PPC.

Forms of PPC
Just as there is not one single best organizational form for private firms, there is not

one single best form of PPC. What works best depends on the nature, scope, and risks

of the projects. We therefore present four ideal-typical forms of PPC. We chose four
forms to make broad distinctions because the smaller the difference between different

forms of PPC, the more difficult it becomes to distinguish between them in practice. In
this we are influenced by business law, which defines a small number of legal forms for
businesses that cover a wide range of business activities and business cultures. And

just as the law does not present one legal form of business organization as preferable to
all others but offers them to meet different needs, we also do not recommend one form
of PPC as best. The form of cooperation should be chosen to best fit the needs of the
participants.

As discussed earlier, we define cooperation by the extent to which participants
coordinate or correlate their decisions. Coordination can range from informal efforts
to formal agreements, even to the complete merger of efforts. The ideal-typical forms
presented here are compatible with the three types of collaboration activities presented

in McGuire (2000): policy/strategy making, resource exchange, and project based.
LEADER-FOLLOWER RELATIONSHIP

The relationship between leaders and followers can be interpreted as a form of

cooperative behavior. It is often, though not always, an implicit form of cooperation,

based on an understanding reached through experience. The leader-follower relationship is more likely to emerge over time from trial and error than as the result of negotia-
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tion. It is possible, however, that a leader-follower relationship may be formally
defined in a contract between participants. We would expect this to occur when participants are very unequal in power or resources. For example, in Kansas City, at the
Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD's) HOPE VI project at

Guinette Manor, the tenant association cooperated with a private company to compete
for contracts from the housing authority. Cooperation with the tenant group gave the
private company an edge, which it acknowledged through its agreement to be a minority stakeholder in the relationship. The HUD agency worked with the two organiza-

tions to provide.contract funds for training to improve -tenant skills (this example is
drawn from Naparstek, Freis, & Kingsley, 2000). HUD had the resources-in this
case, funds-and served as the leader through its financing of the HOPE VI activities;

the nonprofit tenant association and the private contractor were followers.
The leader-follower relationship is a widely used form of PPC. For example, a gov-

ernment wishing to redevelop an area will often assume a leadership role by making
important up-front infrastructure investments with the expectation that private sector
investments will follow. An initial government investment may be necessary to reduce
the risk of private investments. If only one private property owner makes improvements in a run-down neighborhood, the value of his or her investment is reduced by the
poor state of the other properties (negative externalities).
A classic example of this kind of investment strategy is tax increment financing, in
which local government in effect mortgages future property tax revenue increases to
make land improvements, attracting private sector investments, which in turn create

the increased property tax revenue (for more detail on tax increment financing, see
Dougherty & Loveridge, 1998). A well-known example of tax increment financing is

the case of Bloomington, Minnesota, which used the technique to set the stage for the
construction of the Mall of America-the largest mall in the United States. One could

question whether this qualifies as a cooperative effort. We believe that it does because
governments must learn about and be responsive to the goals and objectives of the private sector or the investments in infrastructure will be wasted. If the initial investment
is large and/or very risky, the government agency considering the investment will usu-

ally discuss its plans with private sector organizations first, to ascertain the likelihood
that they will follow its lead. To encourage potential followers, the government may
also offer incentives. Such incentives may not be aimed at any specific organization
but be available to anyone who meets the government's criteria. An example of this
kind of incentive is the "enterprise zone" policy in which companies locating in high-

poverty areas receive selected tax reductions or special access to government contracts. Incentives that are targeted to a specific organization may not fall under the
leader-follower relationship but under one of the other forms of PPC discussed in this
article, particularly the seller-buyer relationship, discussed below.

Hopkins and Schaeffer (1983) discuss a case of resort town development where private interests played the leadership role. The public sector, the U.S. Forest Service,
reacted to their initiative, which eventually led to the establishment of the Snowmass,
Colorado, ski resort. The initiative in that case came from resort developers who
needed the U.S. Forest Service's cooperation and permits for the establishment of the
main attraction, the ski slopes.
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Another case of private leadership with the public sector following along comes

from Michigan. General Motors was interested in increasing its production capacity
and adding 4,300 jobs in the Lansing area but wanted assurance that it would have

access to workers with high-technology manufacturing skills. As part of its incentive
package to General Motors, the state of Michigan awarded $4 million to Lansing Community College to create the Michigan Technical Education Center, which will focus

on high-technology manufacturing skills for new workers as well as workers already
employed in manufacturing (Mayes, 2000).
EXCHANGE RELATIONSHIPS (SELLER-BUYER RELATIONSHIPS)

In a voluntary exchange, both sellers and buyers are better off at the end of

action. They coordinate their decisions, although the extent to which this happens can

differ greatly. In the case of standardized goods and services, no explicit cooperation is
necessary between individual buyers and individual sellers (low transactions costs,
anonymous exchange process), and market intermediaries take care of coordinating

the exchange. In economic development, however, services and goods exchanged
between the private sector and the public sector (up-front infrastructure investments,
financial incentives, commitment to create given numbers and types of jobs, etc.) are

often complex and nonstandardized, and significant coordination between buyer and
seller is necessary (high transaction costs), requiring face-to-face negotiations. Thus,

this type of relationship fits the characteristics of a cooperative relationship (for a theory of buyer-seller networks as a relationship, see Kranton & Minehart, 2001).
Many of the cases of the private provision of public services fall under the heading

of exchange relationships, with the public sector and the private sector working

together over a long period. In many such cases, citizens continue to hold the public
sector responsible for service quality. For example, when local governments contract
with private firms to provide public transportation, the public will address complaints

to the local government, and the government and contractor must work cooperatively
to address grievances and correct problems. An example of this exists in Monongalia
County, West Virginia, where public transportation is provided by a private subcontractor, but government hears citizens' complaints and brings them to the attention of
the subcontractor. For more on PPC in transportation, see Dunn (2000).
Another example is the provision of prisons by private contractors (e.g., Mattera,
Khan, LeRoy, & Davis, 2001). Many economic developers seek to attract private pris-

ons because they provide stable jobs to a community. The private contractor and the
state prison authority must cooperate and coordinate their plans, starting with the
design of the prison and continuing with the running of the prison once the facility has
been completed.
Communities and/or states competing against each other (e.g., Haider, 1992;
Hanson, 1993) for new businesses andjobs can also be regarded as sellers and the busi-

nesses as buyers. Each community offers a set of location attributes (infrastructure,
labor force, amenities) at a certain "price" (effective tax rates and user charges, start-up

subsidies). The main purpose of a community usually is to recruit a firm and keep it in
the community; beyond this, additional long-termjoint projects with the recruited firm
are rare. This is more similar to a seller-buyer relationship than to any of the other
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forms of PPC. Such seller-buyer relationships often require explicit and extensive
cooperation so as to make sure that the buyer's needs are properly met (e.g., site and

labor requirements) and that the seller receives the agreed-upon price (e.g., number of

jobs, size of private investment). Often, the exact nature of what is to be exchanged, of
who is responsible for what, is to be negotiated. Because transactions are often very

complex, it may take considerable time to complete all parts of a transaction.
Describing industrial recruitment as an exchange relationship is accurate because it

captures the most relevant characteristics of such efforts. In particular, it calls attention
to the price at which the exchange takes placeand to the fact that there may be both
competing sellers and other potential buyers. The public sector is not always the seller.
In some instances, the private sector attempts "to sell" a community or region on the

idea of accepting certain types of facilities, such as a garbage incinerator or paper mill.
Although both seller and buyer benefit from their interaction, there is also an obvious element of competition between them over the terms of the exchange. The simultaneous presence of cooperation and competition is not unique to this form of relationship but may be less apparent in the other relationships described in this article.
JOINT VENTURES

The term joint venture is common in practice but is usually described as a special

form of a public-private partnership, another indication that partnership is used to
describe a wide range of different forms of PPC (e.g., UNISON, n.d.). Joint venture

has a clear meaning in private industry, and our use of the term is based on that
meaning.

A joint venture is a useful vehicle if two or more participants expect to gain from
working closely together on a specific issue or project but otherwise wish to keep their
independence from each other (e.g., Bean, 1995). It therefore resembles McGuire's
(2000) project-based collaboration activities. Joint ventures are dedicated to a specific
purpose; they are not open ended. In business, joint ventures are often set up as an independent firm, organized as a corporation. This allows participants to define their finan-

cial commitments up front and to limit their exposure to financial risks. A jointly
appointed board makes decisions. We see similar characteristics in many publicprivate cooperative efforts. In fact, most PPCs in economic development that do not

fall under the previous two categories have the characteristics of ajoint venture: There

is a specific project or issue (purpose), and participants define their financial commitments up front.

Decision making tends to be more complex in public-private than in private-private
joint ventures because government cannot delegate its police powers. Truly joint decision making may therefore not be possible, but strong coordination or correlation can
be achieved. Public-private joint ventures are particularly appropriate when a project
requires the complementary powers and capabilities of the public sector and the private sector. For example, the construction of Coors Field in Denver was possible only

as a public-private joint venture. The government could not acquire a baseball team

and did not have the means and expertise to efficiently operate a baseball stadium; the
private sector did not have the power of eminent domain to obtain ownership of all par-

cels at the target construction site at fair market prices. Another example is the Public/
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Private Partnership Program of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA, n.d.).

spite of its name, this program is more likely to result in public-private joint ventur

than in partnerships as defined in this article. The objective of the FDA (n.d.) is to

leverage its resources "with others outside FDA in ways that will help the Agency me

its public health responsibilities." The FDA defines leveraging as "the creation of re

tionships and/or formal agreements with others outside the FDA that will ultimate

enhance FDA's ability to meet its public health mission." This statement signals an

awareness that cooperation can take on different forms. The limited scope of the coop

eration of the FDA program is illustrated by the requirement of a final report, indica

ing the time-limited nature of the cooperation. A concrete collaborative opportuni

advertised by the FDA is for the development of an improved technique for studyi

the effect of aging on medial gloves, with the goal of improving estimates of their sh
life (FDA, n.d.).

Public-private joint ventures are common in economic development. For example,
a government may seek private businesses to work together to add new economic life

to a designated area. This is the case in the Main Street Program. State government
pays a portion of the cost of a Main Street coordinator and various state consultants
(assessments for historically correct renovations, maintenance and repair, marketing
plans, business plans, and graphic design) if downtown business owners will match
state funds and functions with their own cash contributions. The state effectively pays

a portion of the cost for functions (promotions, marketing vacant slots, events) that

would fall on the management/owners of a private suburban mall. The Main Street
Program compensates for the fragmented ownership present in historic downtown
areas.

When public goods and services are important to private interests, we sometimes
find that private organizations request and support their provision by offering to coop-

erate with the responsible government agency. An example of this is the development

of the first zoning ordinance of Aspen, Colorado, which was initiated and partly
financed by the Aspen Institute (Clifford, 1980). This nonprofit organization was
interested in preserving Aspen's character as a former mining town and in preserving

the value of its investments, and it therefore worked cooperatively with the town to
guide the process of developing the zoning ordinance.
Joint ventures have also become more common in higher education, for example, in

the development or improvement of a sophisticated product. To this end, a private
company may give away a patent to a research university and help fund the further
development of the technology in return for rights to the results from the research.
Typically in joint ventures, interested businesses and the government each agree to

take certain actions and investments. A joint venture is particularly appropriate when
the initial risk of a public investment is high without the assurance that private invest-

ments will follow. By seeking coinvestors in a joint venture, the parties involved can
reduce their risks to an acceptable level (e.g., Stainback, 2000). We call such projects

joint ventures because, first, although important decisions and actions will be coordinated, each participant retains its formal independence. Second, the scope of the pro-

ject is well defined, not open ended, and the same is true for the commitment of
resources by each participant. Finally, such projects are often of limited duration and
have no life beyond the completion of the project.
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Our view of the nature of partnerships is influenced by its legal definition. Fo
ing Kleinberger (1995) and Steffen (1977), we define an ideal-typical partnership as an
open-ended agreement to work together. In such an arrangement, the partners define

the general purpose of the partnership but are open to new developments and opportunities. This view of a partnership is compatible with McGuire's (2000) policy/
strategy-making collaboration activities. Our definition is similar to that of Beauregard (1998) and Peters (1998), with the exception that we put more emphasis on the
open-ended nature of a partnership, whereas Beauregard sees them as serving a spe-

cific purpose. Peters has a somewhat broader view of their purpose: "Rather, in a partnership there is a continuing relationship, the parameters of which are negotiated
among the members from the outset" (p. 13). Peters stresses that in a partnership, all
participants can act on its behalf; that a partnership is "enduring" (p. 13); that all part-

ners bring something into the partnership; and that they share responsibility for the

success of the partnership. Vaillancourt Rosenau (2000b) similarly argues that
"authentic partnering, in theory, involves close collaboration and the combination of
strengths of both the private sector (more competitive and efficient) and the public sector (responsibility and accountability vis-'a-vis society)" (p. 219).
Linder (2000) defines partnerships not by looking at their characteristics but by
considering their benefits. He argues that public-private partnerships can be used as a

tool to achieve management reform, either by changing managerial practices or by
changing the nature of a problem so that it can attract a private for-profit partner. A
public-private partnership may also change the perception of the public that is being
served. Public services are often taken for granted, whereas a service proved by a

mixed public-private entity may be viewed differently. Linder also stresses the benefits

of "risk shifting" (p. 29).

In an ideal-typical partnership, all partners share in the rewards and decision making and assume full responsibility for the risks of their joint activities (see also

Beauregard, 1998, pp. 53-54). We refer to this as a full partnership. In a limited partnership, not all partners share equally in the risks and rewards. The limited partners
reduce their exposure to financial risks to an agreed-upon amount, whereas the unlimited partners are liable with their full faith and credit. For a partnership to exist, at least
one partner must be an unlimited partner.
The National Child Care Partnership Project's definition is similar to ours: "A

public-private partnership exists when the public sector-federal, state, local and/or
tribal officials or agencies-joins with the private sector-families, employers, phi-

lanthropies, media, civic groups, and/or service providers-to attain a shared goal"
(National Child Care Information Center, 2000). The further description also stresses

the importance of the partnership's ability "to change in response to emerging needs
and to take advantage of new opportunities"; finally, "decision-making and management responsibilities are shared among the partners" (National Child Care Information Center, 2000), that is, a partnership's open-ended nature.
Based on our observations and reading of the literature and popular press, we
believe that public-private partnerships are relatively rare. This should not surprise

anyone. The demands of an ideal-typical partnership are significant. As Gray (1985)
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implies, long-term cooperation is more difficult and requires more structure than

short-term cooperative efforts. All partners participate in decision making and share
all risks with their full faith and credit. No wonder that the business partnership is not

the dominant organizational form in the private sector. We believe that the demands of

a partnership also work to make public-private partnerships relatively scarce. Therefore, long-term relationships are more likely to form when there exists a "high degree
of ongoing interdependence." Gray (p. 918) and Rubin and Stankiewicz (2001) pro-

vide case studies of the Los Angeles Community Development Bank and argue that it
failed because not all of the conditions of a full partnership were met. They use Peters's
(1998) definition of a public-private partnership. As mentioned above, this definition
is very closely related to ours.

An example of a public-private partnership in the university context is the licensing
agreement. Increasingly, universities are willing to take equity positions in a start-up
company that may not be financially able to pay licensing fees for university-held pat-

ents. The university forgoes potential revenues by granting an exclusive license,
whereas the private start-up company owners risk their capital.
Workforce development boards are examples of a federal government-private sec-

tor partnership. The federal government creates these boards, but the majority of the
board members are representing for-profit entities. These boards approve private sector and public sector training that is funded by federal dollars. The federal government
seeks private sector partners to ensure that its training dollars go into programs needed
by the private sector.
The Downtown Denver Partnership (DDP), the Minnesota Business Partnership

(http://www.mnbp.com/), and the Pittsburgh Partnership for Neighborhood Develop-

ment (Metzger, 1998) are other examples of successful public-private partnerships.
The purpose of these partnerships when they were founded was broad and open ended.
The partners did not limit their involvement or commitment; their commitment was
open ended and flexible. Of course, this does not mean that the commitment has no

limits, only that they are not strictly specified and open to negotiation. The members of

the DDP include the Denver Urban Renewal Authority. DDP was instrumental in the
construction of the 16th Street Mall, the centerpiece of Denver's downtown

revitalization, and assumed responsibility for the maintenance of the mall (http
www.downtowndenver.com/). It is working with the regional transit district on land-

scaping and updating street lighting. It is also working with the city of Denver on the
redevelopment of Skyline Park. The Missouri Community Development Corporation
Initiative is the name of a piece of legislation aimed at building similar partnerships

(Missouri Revised Statutes, 2001). The legislation proposes a broad purpose for the
proposed Community Development Corporations, shared public-private investment,

and an open-ended time line. Finally, Grossman (1987) provides a detailed description
of a regional public-private partnership.

A close partnership between the public sector and the private sector is not without
risk. Sometimes, community government and business get together and decide what to

do that serves their self-interests-while trying to avoid public input. An example of
such an occurrence is described in a case study in Reese and Rosenfeld (2001).
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Figure 2. Forms of Public-Private Cooperation

Possible Factors Influencing Choice of Form of PPC

In the interest of making clear distinctions, we have presented four ideal-typica

forms of PPC (Figure 2). In real life, a closer form of cooperation may grow out of

weaker form (see Cigler, 1999). Cooperation is not static but a process that changes

over time. As participants gain experience working together successfully, they buil

mutual trust that permits them to take on riskier projects, make bigger commitments

and work together more closely. C. Ellis (1996) and Wiewel and Lieber (1998) also

stress the importance of trust in a partnership; Gray (1985) adds legitimacy to the fac

tors that influence interorganizational cooperation. In the context of PPC, it is hard to

imagine how trust and cooperation could develop without legitimacy. Ferguson (1 99

talks about alliances but refers to their members as partners. He emphasizes the impor

tance of developing trust for moving from a stage of ambivalence to one of commit
ment. Of course, failures of PPC will likely have the opposite effect. In either case, we

should not assume that a PPC remains unchanged over time (see also Ferguson, 1998
p. 593, Figure 13-1).
The appropriate form of PPC depends on the distribution of risks and expected
rewards. We assume that expected rewards are positive for both participants becau
otherwise there is no incentive to cooperate. Then, the nature of cooperation is likely

be influenced by the degree of agreement of interests of the two participants. Let

denote the deviation of interests between the two participants. The smaller D, the mor

closely their interests are aligned. We define D as follows:
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D = EA _EB
RA RB
where Ei > 0 is a measure of expected rewards, and Ri > 0 is a measure of the risk associated with participating in a cooperative effort (i = A, B). Rewards can be nonmonetary,
so E is not necessarily measured in dollars but should be thought of as an index that
measures expected rewards. We posit that the probability of severe conflict between
two potential participants increases with D:

Pr(Severe Conflict) = P(D) and d > 0.
dD

Close cooperation may be inappropriate if there is a mismatch between risks and
rewards. For example, if A faces high expected rewards and low risks, whereas B faces
high expected rewards and high risks, a full partnership is not a desirable form for PPC.
B's greater exposure to risks is likely to lead to the pursuit of a different investment
strategy than that most preferred by A. Thus, they may not be able to make joint deci-

sions. Even if joint decision making is not achievable, however, they may be able to
accomplish a less demanding form of cooperation.

Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of the four ideal-typical forms of cooperation. By implication, the information in the table suggests what form may be most
appropriate, given the purpose of cooperation. Clearly in real-life situations, a PPC
may cut across the lines we draw in this summary table; each PPC will exhibit its own

personality quirks.

A Note on Nonprofit Organizations and PPC
Nonprofit organizations (we use the common abbreviation NGOs [nongovernmental

organizations]) share aspects of both public and private organizations. Although they
lack the coercive powers of government, they also have fewer constraints than government organizations. NGOs are usually less secretive than private businesses and there-

fore less concerned about sharing information with the public. Because they obtained
their tax-exempt status in return for a commitment to some public interest, they are

also philosophically closer to government than private for-profit businesses. In other
words, NGOs combine characteristics of public and of private for-profit organizations.
This makes them potential partners for the public sector, particularly in the area of policy partnerships (Lovrich, 2000).

Hula, Jackson, and Orr (1997) argue that "broad collective interests exist that are
not adequately represented in current governing regimes" and that NGOs "can serve as
a viable platform for the aggregation of collective interests, including under repre-

sented interests" (p. 460). In other words, NGOs often serve as effective coalition
builders and policy initiators (Hula & Jackson-Elmoore, 2001). Linder and Vaillancourt
Rosenau (2000) use the term intersectoral partnerships and consider NGOs as possi-

ble partners of the public sector, particularly in cases when joint efforts rely on grants
or other donors. Smith (2000) provides an interesting example of a nonprofit organiza-
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tion that successfully served as an intermediary between individuals on public wel

aspiring to be "micro-entrepreneurs" and state government, resulting in the chan
state regulations. Thus, NGOs provide a useful legal form for formal public-private

partnerships, especially community development corporations that take on entrepreneurial roles (e.g., Filatov, 2000; Hinnant, 1995). The economic contributions and
impact of NGOs are examined in a collection of essays compiled by Rose-Ackerman

(1986) and in three case studies in Hula et al. The potential significance of NGOs is

underlined by Ingerson's (1999) question regarding the distinction between the public
(Is it synonymous with governmental?) and the private (nongovernmental?), a question that is related to the definition of what constitutes a public good.
In our community development and planning work, we have come across a number
of NGOs that are active in community and economic development, sometimes in
cooperation with local and state governments. We believe that the record of and poten-

tial for economic development partnerships between public organizations and private
nonprofit organizations deserve additional attention in the future.

Conclusions
We are concerned that the widespread use of the term public-private partnership
hides important differences between different forms of PPC and that the emotional
connotation of the term partnership conveys an image of egalitarian and conflict-free

decision making. Differences between the public sector and the private sector (e.g.,
their conflicting organizational cultures) make it likely that conflicts of interest exist.

Such conflicts are to be expected and need not prevent mutually beneficial cooperation. Their inclusion in the analysis is important for an understanding of the nature of
PPC, however.

The term partner is used for a spouse or climbing, tennis, or dancing partner. In
these contexts, the term conveys the existence of mutual trust, complete interdepen-

dence, and shared goals. In the United States, the term partnership also has a clear
legal meaning (e.g., Steffen, 1977). In a full legal partnership, all partners back the
enterprise with their full faith and credit, whereas in a limited partnership, the risks

(and rewards) are unevenly distributed. Finally, the term partner (and partnership)
implies an egalitarian relationship between participants. Public and private organizations have such different powers and capabilities that in most situations, it is difficult to

perceive them as equals. Cooperators often fall into the trap of being co-opted or feel-

ing a loss of authority as the PPC develops, signaling a need to renegotiate or end the
PPC.

Although other forms of PPC are common, public-private partnerships, as defined
in this article, rarely form. An ideal-typical partnership makes high demands on the
partners in terms of their commitment of resources, coordination of decision making,
and exposure to risks. A looser form of cooperation that better protects all participants
may be preferable when there are significant differences of exposure to risks and/or
conflicts of interest between participants. In other words, none of the four forms of
PPC presented in this article is considered to be inherently superior to the others. The
form of the PPC should be chosen to fit the characteristics and needs of the participants
and of the common purpose.
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The review of the literature shows that there is no agreement as to the precise m
ing of the phrase public-private partnership. Some use the term in a narrow sense to

describe the cooperation between the public sector and the private sector in the provision of public services and infrastructure, whereas others use it to describe a multitude

of cooperative activities. Maybe this situation exists because different disciplinesbusiness, economics, law, planning, political science, and public administration-that
do not always use the same terminology have investigated PPC. Analytical approaches
in these disciplines also differ and range from empirical case studies to theoretical
models using game theory (for an application of game theory to the study of exchange

relationships in local economic development, see S. Ellis & Rogers, 2000).
This article provides a vocabulary for a more precise description and differentiated
analysis of PPCs. We defined four forms of PPC, based on the degree to which the participants, through coordinating their decisions, support each other toward achieving
their goals and objectives, that is, the extent to which they correlate their expected
rewards. We use the term partnership to describe a close and open-ended form of
cooperation. Joint ventures are project based and can also lead to close cooperation.

Complex joint ventures, in particular, require close cooperation to succeed. Some joint
ventures may therefore eventually expand beyond a single project and become more
open ended, turning into what we define as a partnership. In leader-follower and

exchange relationships, cooperation between participants is not as close and does not
approach shared decision making, which is the norm in a partnership.
In summary, this article is a step toward a better understanding of PPCs. Its contri-

bution is in providing a vocabulary and classification system that can be used by those

who study PPC in action. The results of future work could lead to a refinement of the
classification system presented here.
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